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REVOCATION OF PARENTAL CONSENT TO ADOPTION:
LEGAL DOCTRINE AND SOCIAL POLICY
Each year over 100,000 adoption petitions are granted.' These decrees
literally create the relationship of parent and child, a relationship fundamental
to society. Clearly, questions of adoption law are of great legal and social
significance. One such question concerns the power of natural parents to
revoke a valid consent to adoption prior to the final adoption decree. This
comment will survey the law on revocation and evaluate it in the light of
relevant sociological and social work materials. 2
For a legal adoption every jurisdiction in most circumstances requires
the consent of the natural parents.3 Yet consent and its revocation are the
elements of adoption law which cause the most confusion and raise the most
problems. 4 There appear to be no published statistics on the frequency of
attempted revocation. The Los Angeles County Bureau of Adoptions reports
five such attempts in 1,806 consents taken in one year.5 Other agencies
estimate the rate at somewhat less than one per cent.6 There is reason to
believe, however, that for private, non-agency adoptions the rate may be
much higher. The Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare estimates
attempted revocation occurs in as many as ten per cent of these cases. 7 The
significance of this variance will be discussed below.
It has ordinarily been said that there are three different rules concerning
revocation of consent. (1) Consent is absolutely revocable until the final
decree. (2) Revocation will be allowed at the discretion of the court. (3) In
the absence of fraud or duress consent is final. It has also been asserted that
the first rule, absolute right of revocation, is the majority position.8 A survey
I In 1959 102,000 adoption petitions were granted. U.S. CmLDREN'S BUREAU, CHILD
WELF a STATiSTICS 1959 at 25 (Statistical Ser. No. 60, 1960).
2 Attacks on the final adoption decree will not be considered. For a treatment of this
question see Note, Attacks on Adoption Decrees by Natural Parents to Regain Custody,
61 YALE L.J. 591 (1952).
3 4 VERNIER, AmERICAN FAMILY LAWS §§ 257, 259 (1936); MADDEN, PSONS AND Do-
MESTIc RELATIONS 357; 2 C.J.S. Adoption § 21(a)(1) (1936). If the child is illegitimate, the
consent of the mother only is usually required. 2 C.J.S. Adoption § 21(c) (1936). The most
common exception to the requirement of parental consent is abandonment. For a complete
catalogue of such exceptions, see Comment, 24 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 359, 361 (1952).
4 CLARKE, SocIAL LEGISLATION 318 (2d ed. 1957); 1 SHAPIRo, A STUDY OF ADOPTION
PRAcricE 94 (1956); YOuNG, OUT OF WEDLOCK 163 (1954).
5 Letter from the Los Angeles County Bureau of Adoptions to The University of Chicago
Law Review, Jan. 16, 1961, on file in The University of Chicago Law Library. (All letters
hereinafter cited are on file in The University of Chicago Law Library.)
6 Letters from various adoption agencies to The University of Chicago Law Review.
7 Letter from the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare to The University
of Chicago Law Review, Jan 13, 1961.
8 Annot., 138 A.L.R. 1038 (1942); 2 C.J.S. Adoption § 21(a)(4); Note, 9 VAND. L. Rv-
396-97 (1956). A trend toward the discretionary rule is noted in Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1011
(1945).
of current law, however, discloses that the second rule, revocation at the
discretion of the court, now has the most adherents. Furthermore, although
the three general rules state the law correctly, there are definite subpositions
under each rule; the principal variable is the time at which consent becomes
irrevocable or revocable only with court permission.
Fifteen jurisdictions give the natural parent or parents an absolute right
to revoke consent. In nine of these the right is continuous until the final
decree.9 In Arkansas, Ohio, and Tennessee it continues until the interlocutory
order. 10 Arizona and Hawaii terminate the right after the child is placed
in the prospective adoptive home; thereafter they follow the discretionary
rule.11 North Carolina does not allow revocation after the interlocutory
decree, or in any event after six months.12
Twenty-five jurisdictions adhere in whole or in part to the rule placing the
right of recovation within the discretion of the court. In fifteen of these the
rule obtains until the final decree.13 In three jurisdictions, District of Colum-
9 Kansas-In re Thompson's Adoption, 178 Kan. 127, 283 P.2d 493 (1955); Louisiana-
In re Harville, 233 La. 2, 96 So. 2d 20 (1957); Green v. Paul, 212 La. 338, 31 So. 2d 819
(1957) (But see LA. REV. STAT. § 9:431, as amended, Acts 1960, No. 268 § 3, which may
have enacted the discretion or no revocation position.); Michigan-In re White's Adoption,
300 Mich. 378, 1 N.W.2d 579 (1942); Minnesota-In re Anderson, 189 Minn. 85, 248
N.W. 657 (1933) (decided on an apparent misreading of State v. Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435,
183 N.W. 956 (1921)); Mississippi-Mayfield v. Braund, 217 Miss. 514, 64 So. 2d 713
(1953) (Although the court can grant adoption over parental objection if the parent is moral-
ly unfit, this would seem to be a condition for dispensing with consent, not a derogation
of the absolute right to revoke.); Pennsylvania-In re Stone's Adoption, 398 Pa. 190, 156
A.2d 808 (1959); South Dakota-S.D. CODE tit. 14, § 14.0406 (1939) (Parents must consent
at the hearing; consent before then is of no effect, hence obviously revocable.); Texas-
Catholic Charities v. Harper, 337 S.W.2d 111 (rex. 1960); Washington-In re Nelms, 153
Wash. 242, 279 Pac. 748 (1929). The statutes cited in this and the following thirteen foototes
are those which deal expressly with revocation of consent.
10 Martin v. Ford, 224 Ark. 993, 277 S.W.2d 842 (1955); Kozak v. Lutheran Children's
Aid Soc'y, 164 Ohio St. 335, 130 N.E.2d 796 (1955) (dictum), OsIo REv. CODE tit. 31,
§ 3107.06 (1953); TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 36, § 117 (1956).
" In re Holman's Adoption, 80 Ariz. 201, 295 P.2d 372 (1956); HAWAn REV. LAWS
ch. 331, § 331-2 (1955).
12 In re Hoose's Adoption, 243 N.C. 589, 91 S.E.2d 555 (1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. ch.
48, § 48-11 (1959 Supp.).
13 California-Adoption of Pitcher, 103 Cal. App. 2d 859, 230 P.2d 449 (1951), CAL.
CIVIL CODE tit. 2, ch. 2, § 226a (1960); Connecticut-Bailey v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593,
87 A.2d 388 (1952); Georgia-Hendrix v. Hunter, 99 Ga. App. 785, 110 S.E.2d 35 (1959),
GA. CODE ANN. tit. 74, § 74-403 (1958 Supp.); Iowa-Re Adoption of Cannon, 243 Iowa
828, 53 N.W.2d 877 (1952); Kentucky-Welsh v. Young, 240 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. Ct. of App.
1951); Maryland-King v. Shandrowski, 218 Md. 38, 145 A.2d 281 (1958) (MD. ANN.
CODE art. 16, § 74 makes consent revocable at any time, but the same section grants the
court discretion to decree adoption without parental consent if in the best interests of the
child. Thus, a discretionary rule results.); Massachusetts-In re Adoption of Minor, 338
Mass. 635, 156 N.E.2d 801 (1959); Missouri-In re G.K.D., 332 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1960), VERN. ANN. Mo. STAT. tit. 30, § 453.050(2) (1952); New Hampshire-Durivage
v. Vincent, 102 NH. 481, 161 A,2d 175 (1960); New Jersey-In re Adoption of Child by
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bia, Indiana, and Nevada, the courts apparently consider consent absolutely
irrevocable. But when the courts rule on an adoption petition they consider
all factors, including the natural parents' desire to reassert their rights to the
child, and they decree the adoption or deny it according to the best interests
of the child. These jurisdictions thus follow a discretionary rule for all practi-
cal purposes.14 Arkansas follows the discretionary rule after the interlocutory
order.15 As noted above, Arizona and Hawaii allow revocation with court
permission after placement.16 Montana, Wisconsin, and Oklahoma adhere
to the discretionary rule until the interlocutory order.17 In Delaware the par-
ents can ask for judicial permission to revoke consent within sixty days of the
filing of the adoption petition.' 8
Nine jurisdictions make consent absolutely irrevocable from the date of
its execution or some later date. Only two of these, Florida and Illinois,
hold consent irrevocable from its execution.19 Five jurisdictions absolutely
foreclose the right to revoke after the interlocutory decree.20 As noted above
North Carolina allows no revocation after the interlocutory decree or a six
month period.2 1 In Delaware the right to ask for revocation expires sixty
days after the adoption petition is filed.22
Because the New York decisions are in conflict, no rule can-definitely be
assigned to that state. The highest New York court to consider the question
S, 57 N.J. Super. 154, 154 A.2d 129 (1959); New Mexico-Borwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M.
183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957); Oregon-In re Adoption of Lauless, 216 Ore. 188, 338 P.2d
660 (1959); South Carolina-Driggers v. Jolley, 219 S.C. 31, 64 S.E.2d 19 (1951); Utah-
Miller v. Miller, 8 Utah 2d 290, 333 P.2d 945 (1959)(semble); West Virginia-Lane v. Pippin,
110 W.Va. 357, 158 S.E. 673 (1931) (dictum).
14In re Adoption of A Minor, 127 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C. 1954); In re Adoption of A
Minor, 144 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Rhodes v. Shirley, 234 Ind. 587, 129 N.E.2d 60
(1955); Exparte Schultz, 64 Nev. 264, 181 P.2d 585 (1947).
"5 Martin v. Ford, 224 Ark. 993, 277 S.W.2d 842 (1955).
16In re Holman's Adoption, 80 Ariz. 201, 295 P.2d 372 (1956); HAWAIl REV. LAWS
ch. 331, § 331-2 (1955).
17 MONT. REv. CODES tit. 61, § 206 (1959 Supp.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.10 (1960
Supp.); WIsc. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, ch. 48, § 48.86 (1957). These three statutes enact § 6 of
the UN FoRM ADOPTION ACT.
Is In re Fusco, 50 Del. 241, 127 A.2d 468 (Orphan's Ct. of Del. 1956); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, ch. 9, sec. 909 (1953).
19 Skeen v. Marx, 105 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. of App. 1958); In re Simaner's Petition
15 Ill.2d 568, 155 N.E.2d 555 (1959); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-11 (1959).
20 Montana-MoNT. REv. CODES tit. 61, § 206 (1959 Supp.); Ohio-Kozak v. Lutheran
Children's Aid Soc'y, 164 Ohio St. 335, 130 N.E.2d 796 (1955) (dictum); OHIo R~v.
CODE tit. 31, § 3107.06 (1953); Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.10 (1960 Supp.);
Tennessee-TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 36, § 117 (1956); Wisconsin-WIsc. STAT. ANN. tit. 7,
ch. 48, § 48.86 (1957).
21 See authorites cited note 12 supra.
22 See authorities cited note 18 supra,
applied the discretionary rule.23 The most recent New York case followed the
absolute-right-of-revocation rule.24 The remaining New York decisions apply
both rules, and absolute right of revocation seems to be the more prevalent
view. 25 Eleven jurisdictions appear to have no case or statute law on the
question. 26 England gives an absolute right of revocation. 27
Some jurisdictions distinguish between consent to adoption and absolute
surrender of the custody of the child to an agency, thereby terminating
parental rights. These states hold the consent revocable at will or revocable
only at the court's discretion, but consider the surrender to an agency ab-
solutely irrevocable. 28
A revocation in the course of the adoption process is a serious, often tragic
event for the adoptive parents, the agency, the child and, quite likely, the
revoking natural parents. It is extremely disheartening for adoptive parents
who have invested in a child financially and, more important, emotionally
to have it taken from them by a natural parent who has previously consented
to the adoption.29 From the viewpoint of the agency a recovation means that
its painstaking efforts to find a home and child suitable for one another
have gone for naught. 30 Furthermore, revocations discourage prospective
adoptive parents. For the child, revocation may mean an abrupt change in
environment after the infant has become settled in the adoptive home. Such
a change can seriously damage the child's developing personality. 31 Also,
23 In re Adoption of Anonymous, 286 App. Div. 161, 143 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1955), motion
for leave to appeal denied, 286 App. Div. 968, 146 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1955).
24 People v. Anonymous, 19 Misc. 2d 441, 195 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
25 See In re Van Allen's Adoption, 9 Misc. 2d 381, 170 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Erie County
Ct. 1958); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 198 Misc. 185, 101 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Del. County
Ct. 1950).
26 Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Nebraska, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. But cf. Vaughn v. Hubbard, 38 Idaho 451, 221 Pac.
1107 (1923), which suggests that if presented with the question Idaho would allow an
absolute right of revocation on procedural grounds like those established by the South Da-
kota Statue, S.D. CODE tit. 14, § 14.046 (1939).
27 Watson v. Nikolaisen, [1955] 2 Q.B. 286.
28 E.g., In re White's Adoption, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N.W.2d 579 (1942). Compare Gonzales
v. Toma, 330 Mich. 35, 46 N.W.2d 453 (1951); Catholic Charities v. Harper, 337 S.W.2d
Il1 (Texas Sup. Ct. 1960).
29 Doss, IF You ADOPT A CHILD 147 (1957).
30 Letter from The Catholic Home Bureau, Archdiocese of Chicago to The University
of Chicago Law Review, Jan. 12, 1961.
31 See YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 161; Clothier, Some Aspects of the Problem
of Adoption, 9 AMERIcAN JOURNAL OF ORTHO-PSYCHIATRY 598, 608 (1939); Kestenberg,
Separation From Parents, 3 NERvous CHILD 20 (1943). For an extreme case, see In re Bilyeu's
Adoption, 210 Ore. 652, 310 P.2d 305 (1957). The court allowed revocation, although
the child had been in the adoptive home for six and one half years, noting somewhat
ruefully that its decision "is probably unfortunate from the standpoint of the child."
Id. at 306.
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many children placed for adoption are illegitimate.3 2 Revocation in these
cases deprives the child of its only chance to escape the status and stigma of
illegitimacy and thrusts it back into an environment where it has little chance
to lead a happy or normal life.33 For the natural parent, especially if an unwed
mother, the return of the child is often not a solution to her problems and
may well retard her social adjustment.3 4
In addition to the foregoing considerations an absolute right of revocation
may provide an opportunity for natural parents to extort money from the
adoptive parents in return for a promise not to revoke consent.3 5 It also
gives the natural parents the power to choose, perhaps for a consideration,
between contesting sets of adoptive parents.3 6
The decisions allowing an absolute right of revocation often disclose
a socially unenlightened treatment of the problem. Three common grounds
for allowing an absolute right of revocation emerge from the cases. One
rationale is that consent is necessary to the court's jurisdiction to grant the
adoption and if consent is not present at the time of the hearing the court
is ousted of jurisdiction. 37 Granting arguendo that consent is necessary for
jurisdiction, there seems to be no reason why consent cannot be executed
at a date prior to the hearing and subsist irrevocably until then.
A second common judicial attitude is that parental rights are foremost
in an adoption proceeding and must be protected at the expense of the
child's welfare if necessary. Typical of this view is the assertion of the Louisi-
ana court in Green v. Paul: "Manifestly a decree of adoption cannot be predi-
cated solely on the best interests of the child ... ."38 Of course the rights of
the natural parents must be protected; but there is no reason why these rights
cannot validly be relinquished by a consent executed prior to the hearing.
Indeed, such prior relinquishment is necessary in the adoption process.
A waiting period between placement and final decree is essential so that the
32 53 per cent of children placed for adoption are illegitimate. U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 30. For adoptions by non-relatives, which present the most legal and
social difficulties, the figure is 76 per cent. Id. at 3.
33 YOUNG, op, cit. supra note 4, at 152; Young, The Unmarried Mother's Decision
About Her Child, 28 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL CASEWORK 27, 30 (1947).
34 See YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 152-63.
35 E.g., In re Adoption of Anonymous, 286 App. Div. 161, 143 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1955),
motion for leave to appeal denied, 286 App. Div. 968, 146 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1955).
36 In In re Thompson's Adoption, 178 Kan. 127, 283 P.2d 493 (1955), the mother
consented to an adoption by petitioners. Subsequently she changed her mind and attempted
to revoke and give consent in favor of her aunt and uncle. The court, adhering to the
absolute right of revocation rule, denied the adoption petition.
37 See, e.g., Wheeler v. Howard, 211 Ga. 596, 87 S.E.2d 377 (1955); In re Thompson's
Adoption, 178 Kan. 127, 283 P.2d 493 (1955); Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 31 So. 2d 819
(1947).
38 212 La. 337, 349, 31 So. 2d 819, 823 (1947).
mutual suitability of the child and the adoptive home can be evaluated.
Most statutes provide such a period.39 But trial placement is unfair to the
adoptive parents if the natural parents can regain custody at any time prior
to the final decree. Many adoptive parents probably would be unwilling to
consent to a trial placement on these terms. Some courts justify protection of
parental rights at the expense of the child's welfare by rationalizing that if
the natural parents are unsuitable the child can be protected in a subsequent
action to deprive them of custody. This attitude is typified by the statement
of the Illinois court in Jackson v. Russel: "The welfare of the child is
a much more appropriate yardstick in a custody case than in an adoption
matter. [Adoption is] a very different matter from a change of custody which
could be on a temporary basis."40 Foster or boarding home placement,
the temporary change of custody referred to by the Illinois court, is criticized
by social workers as entirely unsatisfactory for the child.41 It is in no sense
a satisfactory substitute for a permanent home with permanent parents
and it is not a valid justification for the subordination of the child's welfare
as a consideration in an adoption proceeding.
The third ground, express or implicit in many decisions allowing an
absolute right of revocation, is the notion that the natural parents are in-
herently the best parents and the child should be kept with them at all costs.
These decisons are more often characterized by maudlin sentimentality than
by rational concern for the interests of all the parties. An Ohio judge taking
this attitude found inspiration for his decision, allowing revocation, in two
pictures which hung on the wall of his home and which, he avowed, he had
viewed daily for forty years.42 Another, of more lyric than artistic bent, took
39 VERNmR, op. cit. supra note 3, § 254; CLARKE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 325; U.S.
CHILDREN's BUREAU, THE CHANGING SCENE IN CHILD WELFARE 10 (Child Welfare Reports
No. 9, 1959).
40 342 111. App. 637, 639, 97 N.E.2d 584 (1951). See Watson v. Nikolaisen, [1955] 2 Q.B.
286. The Jackson case turned on whether the natural parents had abandoned the child, thus
dispensing with the necessity of consent. The court found no abandonment and denied the
adoption petition, but awarded custody to the petitioners until the natural parents improved
their "conduct and habits." In an eleven year period Illinois has followed each of the
three rules on revocation. Lutterback, The Law in Illinois Pertaining to the Adoption
of Children, 8 DE PAUL L. Rav. 165, 167 (1959). Illinois now allows no revocation. Authori-
ties cited note 19 supra.
41 See YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 33; Young, supra note 33, at 157, 163; ELLIOT
& MERRIL, SOCIAL DISORGANIZATON 151 (3d ed. 1950); Letter from the Massachusetts
Department of Public Welfare to The University of Chicago Law Review, Jan. 13, 1961;
Letter from the Los Angeles County Bureau of Adoptions to The University of Chicago
Law Review, Jan. 16, 1961; Letter from the Illinois Children's Home and Aid Society to The
University of Chicago Law Review, Feb. 3, 1961.
42 In re Adoption of Kane, 19 Ohio App. 327, 108 N.E.2d 176 (1952). One picture de-
picted a child being taken from its peasant mother and "adopted" by the wealthy land
owner. The second picture portrayed the reunion of child and mother some years later.
The child is beautifully garbed, the mother still poor but the expressions on their faces
are "those of sheer joy."
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liberties with the familiar American ballad in remarking: "Be it ever so humble
there's no place as good as the family home.... ."43 All other things being
equal the notion of the innate superiority of the natural parents might be
valid. But in the adoption situation all other things are seldom equal. As
noted above, the natural parents seeking to revoke may not be suitable,
especially if the child is illegitimate. 44 On the other hand adoptive parents
are carefully screened by the agency, where one is involved, and tend to be
above average in those family traits susceptible of empirical analysis.45
Another matter deserving consideration in an evaluation of legal doctrine
concerning revocation of consent is the problem of the private and "black
market" adoption where no agency is involved.46 At the time her child is
born the unwed mother is usually emotionally distraught. Also, unwed
mothers are often seriously neurotic and have difficulty making decisions
based on realistic considerations.47 This mother is particularly vulnerable
to efforts, well-meaning or unscrupulous, to persuade her to sign a consent.
Such consents may be executed under circumstances not amounting to legal
fraud or duress; but their truly voluntary nature may be questioned. When
an agency arranges an adoption the mother is given professional guidance
and counseling to help her realize that adoption is the best solution for
her and for her child; she is not urged to sign a consent unless and until she
is validly convinced of its wisdom.48 In the private placement and "black
market" adoption the mother may be exploited for financial gain and in any
event is not given necessary counseling prior to signing the consent.49 As
a result she may not be psychologically prepared to consent and later may
have misgivings and attempt to revoke. In this connection it is significant
to note the observation of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare
that revocation is attempted much more frequently in non-agency adoptions
than in agency supervised placements. 50 Thus the solution to the revocation
problem depends in part upon legal regulation of the private adoption.
43 Wheeler v. Howard, 211 Ga. 596, 597, 87 S.E.2d 377 (1955).
44 See text accompanying notes 32, 33 supra.
45 E.g., educational and occupational level of parents. See BROOKS & BROOKS, ADvENTuR-
ING IN ADOPTION 187 (1939).
46 The scope of this comment does not permit an extended discussion of this topic.
See Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE
L.J. 715 (1950).
47 Young, supra note 32, at 28.
48 See letters from various adoption agencies to The University of Chicago Law Review:
Young, supra note 33; U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, PROTECTING CHILDREN IN ADOPTION
15 (Publication No. 354, 1959); SHAPIRO, op. cit. supra note 4, at 110.
49 See U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, op. cit. supra note 48, at 15; U.S. CULDREN'S BUREAU,
EssENTiALS OF ADOPTION LAW AND PROCEDURE 5 (Publication No. 331, 1949).
50 Letter from the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare to The University
of Chicago Law Review, Jan. 13, 1961.
Unfortunately the law has not been particularly effective in this area. 51
Also, the law should prescribe formalities for the execution of consent
sufficient to safeguard the mother from those who would victimize her.
Consent might be required to be executed before a judge. However, this would
further congest already crowded court calendars and an appearance in court
might embarrass the unwed mother. 52 A better provision would require
the execution of consent before a social worker or officer of the state welfare
department. This person could be sure the mother understands the significance
of the consent and is emotioually prepared to give it. California has such
a provision,53 and it is reported to have been successful in almost eliminating
the problem of revocation. 54
The rule denying any revocation does, of course, eliminate the many
problems already noted. Some adoption agencies favor such a rule.SS The
discretionary rule, however, would seem to be the most desirable of the three
positions and it is favored by many thoughtful commentators on adoption
problems.56 The court, assisted by its investigative and advisory personnel,
is usually in the best position to decide what course of action is best for the
child and the parents in each case. The discretionary rule allows the court
leeway to approve a revocation when the facts of the individual case warrant
it. Of course a discretionary rule is only as good as the discretion which is
exercised; thus, a consideration of judicial performance in the exercise of
discretion is appropriate here. The statutes furnish no specific criteria
for the guidance of the courts. Generally they require only a consideration
of the best interests of the child.57 Likewise, most of the decisions cite only
this general principle to justify their ruling. A few decisions announce more
51 See Comment, YALE L.J., supra note 46, at 725, 731-35; SHAPIRO, Op. cit. supra
note 4, at 112. In 1959, 39 per cent of the children adopted by non-relatives were placed
without the assistance of a social agency. U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, op cit. supra note 1,
at 3. Of course it devolves on the individual practitioner, when consulted by clients
who desire to adopt or place a child for adoption, to refer them to a licensed public or pri-
vate adoption agency. See Elson & Elson, Lawyers and Adoption: The Lawyer's Responsi-
bility in Perspective, 41 A.B.A.J. 1125 (1955).
52 GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 258 (1954).
53 CAL. CIVIL CODE, § 226 (1949).
54 Letter from the Los Angeles County Bureau of Adoptions to The University of
Chicago Law Review, Jan. 16, 1961.
55 Four of the ten agencies replying to the survey letter favored this rule.
56 See CLARKE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 320; U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU (Publication No.
331) op. cit. supra note 49, at 14. Five of the ten adoption agencies replying to the survey
letter favored the discretionary rule. One agency expressed no opinion on this point.
57 UNIFORm ADOPTION AcT § 6 (best interests of the child); CAL. CIVIL CODE. § 226(a)
(1960) (reasonable in view of all the circumstances; best interests of the child); HAWAII
REV. LAWS ch. 331, § 331-2 (1955) (best interests of the child); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, ch.
9, § 909 (1953) (on recommendation of the Department of Public Welfare or authorized
adoption agency).
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specific grounds, e.g., stigma of illegitimacy,58 encouragement of adoption, 59
and the fact that the child has been in the adoptive home for some time.6 0
A Massachusetts court allowed revocation at the request of a Roman Catholic
mother who discovered that the adoptive parents were Jewish.61 Most of the
decisions compare the financial and social condition of the natural parent
or parents with that of the adoptive parents. In the majority of cases it is
clear that the child will be better off with the adoptive parents and the re-
quested revocation is denied. The absence, in cases and statutes alike, of
specific criteria for the exercise of discretion is probably due in part to the
simplicity of most of the cases. But "hard" cases occasionally arise. A
legitimate child may be given up for adoption by natural parents in dire
financial straits and their financial situation may subsequently improve. 62
Or the parents of an illegitimate child may marry and demonstrate the
desire and capacity to give their child an excellent home.63 The reports
disclose very few such cases, but it is here that more concrete statutory stand-
ards would be desirable. In these cases the court must balance considerations
of the suitability of the natural parents with the rights and suitability of the
adoptive parents who may have cared for the child since birth. Another
consideration is the effect a change of environment may have on the child.
Furthermore, the court should be alert to those cases where the unwed
mother has been pressured into signing a consent. The legal doctrines of
fraud and duress may not be sufficiently inclusive to provide protection in
these cases but judges can rectify inequities by allowing revocation.64
Besides substantive provisions, two other deficiencies in the law of revoca-
tion, and adoption in general, warrant comment. They are the lack of uni-
58 Martin v. Ford, 224 Ark. 993, 277 S.W.2d 842 (1955); Hendrix v. Hunter, 99 Ga.
App. 785, 110 S.E.2d 35 (1959).
59 Rhodes v. Shirley, 234 Ind. 587, 129 N.E.2d 60 (1955); Ex parte Schultz, 64 Nev.
204, 181 P.2d 585 (1947).
60 A v. B, 217 Ark. 844, 233 S.W.2d 629 (1950); Re Adoption of Cannon, 243 Iowa
828, 53 N.W.2d 877 (1952); Welsh v. Young, 240 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1951);
King v. Shandrowski, 218 Md. 38, 145 A.2d 281 (1958); In re Adoption of Minor, 338 Mass.
635, 156 N.E.2d 801 (1959).
61 Ellis v. McCoy, 332 Mass. 254, 124 N.E.2d 266 (1955). The question of matching the
religion of the child's natural parents with that of the adoptive parents is one of the most
sensitive and controversial areas of adoption procedure. Apart from the merits of this
controversy it should be noted that the practice of matching is followed by most adoption
agencies. SHAPIRO, op. cit. supra note 4, at 58-60.
.
62 An interesting case is Adoption of McDonnell, 77 Cal. App. 2d 805, 176 P.2d 778
(1947). The natural parents were about to move to South America where they anticipated
living in primitive circumstances. When they arrived in Caracas they were able to live in
a home with servants. The court allowed them to revoke consent and regain the child.
63 See, e.g., Jambrone v. David, 16 Ill. 2d 32, 156 N.E.2d 419 (1959) which, however,
turned on the question of whether the parents were married when the child was conceived,
thus making the father's consent necessary.
64 See, e.g., Petition of Dickholtz, 341 Ill. App. 400, 94 N.E.2d 89 (1950).
formity and clarity in the law. It is apparent from the foregoing discussion
that there is wide divergence among state adoption laws. Easy interstate
adoption is necessary to meet adequately the demand for adoptable children
and in some cases to place a child in the most suitable home available. Yet
disparity in the law can make interstate adoption an uncertain and risky
affair. 65 The Uniform Adoption Act is a hopeful step toward needed uniformi-
ty,66 but it has been enacted in only a few states.
The natural parent considering placing her child for adoption will probably
discuss the matter with doctors, nurses and social workers before an attorney
enters the picture. A number of adoption cases disclose that parents often
are misadvised about their rights of revocation by well-meaning laymen.
A common mistake is interpreting the waiting period between placement
and final decree as a period during which consent can be revoked.67 The law
should enunciate cleariy, preferably by statute, the legal effect of a consent
so that laymen who will invariably advise parents can advise them correctly. 68
Yet only fourteen jurisdictions have a statutory provision on revocation of
consent and eleven have neither statutes nor case law.69
It is apparent that adoption problems require the careful consideration of
lawyers, judges and social workers. But progress and needed reform in adop-
tion practice and procedure will not be achieved if each group works exclusive-
ly within its own field. Only by cooperation and mutual respect among the
disciplines can the institution of adoption be developed adequately to meet
the needs of society.
65 See SHAPmO, op. cit. supra note 4, at 92; Doss, op, cit. supra note 29, at 209; BROOKS
& BROOKS, op. cit. supra note 45, at 119; U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, op. cit. supra note 39,
at 13. For discussion of conflict of laws relating to adoption, consult EfRlENSWEIG, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 51, p. 182; Taintor, Adoption in the Conflict of Laws, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 222
(1954).
66 But see SHAPIRO, op. cit. supra note 4, at 108. The author notes that in the opinion
of some social welfare authorities the UNi'ORM ADOPTION ACT is "incomplete and in-
adequate."
67 E.g., Petition of Dickholtz, 341 Il. App. 400, 94 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
68 Even attorneys are not immune from confusion concerning revocation. See CLAD,
FAMmIY LAW, 45 (Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the A.L.I. and the
A.B.A.). The author erroneously states that "any court" will allow revocation of consent
prior to the hearing.
69 Authorities cited notes 9-22, 26 supra.
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